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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Misinterpreted I.C. § 18-7905(1)(A) As Requiring That No-
Contact Orders Issued In Another State Be Substantially Conforming To I. C. § 
39-6303 Before They May Be Used To Enhance A Stalking Charge 
The state charged Hartzell with felony stalking in violation of I.C. § 18-
7905(1)(a). (R., p. 63.) The stalking charge was elevated to a felony because 
the contact constituting the crime was also in violation of a "civil protection order" 
issued out of Washington.1 (ld.) The stalking statute provides: "A person 
commits the crime of stalking in the first degree if ... [t]he actions constituting the 
offense are in violation of a temporary restraining order, protection order, no 
contact order or injunction, or any combination thereof." I.C. § 18-7905(1)(a). 
The language and intent of this statute are clear: If a court order prohibiting 
stalking behaviors toward another person is insufficient to deter a defendant from 
stalking that person, his stalking crime is elevated from a misdemeanor to a 
felony. 
Hartzell argues that the phrase "protection order" in I.C. § 18-7905(1)(a) 
must be given the definition of that phrase contained in I.C. § 39-6303(8), and 
therefore the felony stalking statute includes only protection orders issued 
"pursuant to a provision similar to section 39-6306, Idaho Code." (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 7-8 (quoting I.C. § 39-6303(8)(b)).) Idaho Code section 39-6306, in 
turn, allows protection orders in the context of existing or former domestic 
1 A copy of the order in question is included in the record as State's Exhibit 2. It 
is titled "Order for Protection - Harassment" and was issued upon a finding that 
Hartzell "committed unlawful harassment, as defined in RCW 10.14.080." It 
proscribes "surveillance," "attempts to contact," and "being within 200 [feet]" of 
the victim or her children. 
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relationships. Thus, Hartzell concludes, the fact that there was no domestic 
relationship between Hartzell his victim means the 
applicable if the stalking violates a temporary restraining order, protection order, 
no contact order or injunction, or any combination thereof precludes application 
of the enhancement. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-10.) Application of established 
legal standards for interpreting statutes shows this argument to be without merit. 
"Statutory definitions provided in one act do not apply for all purposes and 
in all contexts but generally only establish what they mean where they appear in 
that same act." Statev. Yzaguirre, 1441daho471, 477,163 P.3d 1183,1189 
(2007) (internal quote and citation omitted); see also Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 
829, 836, 590 P.2d 85, 92 (1979) ("It is a matter of common understanding that 
definitional provisions do not purport to prescribe what meanings shall attach to 
the defined terms for all purposes and in all contexts but generally only establish 
what they mean where they appear in that same act."). Hartzell has presented 
no reason why the definition of "protection order" from a different legislative act 
should apply to the stalking statute under which he was charged. 
The stalking statute under which Hartzell was charged appears in the 
chapter on malicious harassment. I.C. § 18-7901, et seq. Nothing in that 
chapter, or in the stalking provision of I.C. §§ 18-7905 and 7906, indicate the 
crimes defined therein are confined to domestic situations. By contrast, the 
definition of "protection order" cited by Hartzell appears in the "Domestic 
Violence Crime Prevention Act." I.C. § 39-6301. It is obvious why its definitions 
would be limited to domestic situations. Hartzell's attempt to transfer a definition 
2 
of protection orders that is limited to domestic situations from the Domestic 
Violence Prevention into the stalking statute, which applies to all 
stalking behavior regardless of a domestic relationship, is directly contrary to the 
general rule that such definitions only apply to statutes in the same act. The two 
statutes are not in pari materia, and the definitions from the Domestic Crime 
Prevention Act are inapplicable to limit stalking crimes to domestic relationships. 
Even if the definition from the Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act 
applied to the stalking statute, Hartzell has failed to show that he was not within 
the felony enhancement. Hartzell's stalking was a felony if the "actions 
constituting the offense [were] in violation of a temporary restraining order, 
protection order, no contact order or injunction, or any combination thereof." I. C. 
§ 18-7905(1 )(a). Even if Hartzell's argument had merit, and the term "protection 
order" required a domestic relationship, he has failed to show that the terms 
"temporary restraining order," "no contact order," or "injunction" are defined by 
the Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act to require a domestic relationship. 
Even a quick review of the Washington order in question (State's Exhibit 2) 
demonstrates probable cause to believe it is a no contact order or an injunction. 
The Washington order includes a finding that Hartzell "committed unlawful 
harassment, as defined in RCW 1 0.14.080" and orders him to refrain from 
"surveillance," "attempts to contact," and "being within 200 [feet]" of the victim or 
her children. (State's Exhibit 2.) It is, on its face, a no contact order, compare 
I.C. § 18-920 (allowing no contact orders), or an injunction, compare Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 273, 985 P.2d 1127, 1135 (1999) (injunction may be 
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granted where enjoined party "is violating, or threatens to violate, some right of 
seeking the fails because even if 
term "protection order" as used in LC. § 18-7905(a) applies only if a defendant 
has been in a domestic relationship with the victim, Hartzell has failed to even 
argue, much less show, that the other terms used in that statute-"temporary 
restraining order," "no contact order," or "injunction"-are so limited. 
In this case the district court effectively held that only defendants who 
have been in a domestic relationship with their victims could be guilty of felony 
stalking for violating a court order against contacting or harassing the victim. (R., 
pp. 1 08-11.) There is no statutory basis for this limitation. Application of the 
rules of statutory construction show the district court erred, and that the felony 
enhancement to stalking for violating a protection order, a no contact order, a 
temporary restraining order, an injunction, or any combination of such orders 
applies regardless of any prior domestic relationship between the stalker and the 
victim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to reverse the lower court's order reducing 
the charge to a misdemeanor, reinstate the information, and remand for further 
proceedings on the felony charge. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2013. 
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